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The impact of election law on the (dis)proportionality of representation of voters in legislatures has been intensively studied. Empirically, it is quite clear and widely accepted that election laws greatly influence the manner in which citizens' votes at the polls are converted into seats in the legislature.1 More specifically, electoral systems with some form of proportional representation rules, large districts and low legal thresholds convert votes into seats quite accurately. Electoral systems with higher thresholds, smaller districts and, especially, plurality rules often create substantial distortion in the proportionality of vote-seat representation. Scholars concerned about representation in democracies have used vote-seat disproportionality as one measure of the quality of representation, concluding that low threshold proportional representation (PR) election laws generally provide better representation.2 Presumably, disproportionality is a relevant measure in this context because vote-seat as such would therefore be inappropriate for normative evaluations of electoral systems from a majoritarian point of view.
We address these concerns in two stages. First, we investigate the causal connection between electoral law and disproportionality, taking particular account of the national-district aggregation problem. Then, we move analysis of the performance of election laws in creating desirable representation of citizen preferences in the primary law-authorizing body -the national legislature -beyond the vote-seat measures of disproportionality. Our tool for doing so is the left-right scale, which makes it possible to compare the policy-positions of citizens with the policy-positions of the parties that represent them in a kind of 'super' issue dimension.
The latter analysis requires us to accept the meaningfulness of the left-right scale as a measure of preference. We recognize that this assumption is not always justified, and particularly that the reduction of multiple dimensions into this single one is more problematic in some situations than others. But substantial work on public opinion suggests that the left-right scale position is a reasonable summary of citizens' views in the context of national political debate in most of these countries.5 Our analysis requires only that the distances between left-right positions be comparable across times and countries, not that the substantive positions be similar (see also the more detailed discussion in the penultimate section below).
Despite the inevitable concerns about the left-right metric, it has two critical advantages. First, this approach allows us begin analysis with a direct measure of citizen preferences rather than with votes. Secondly, unlike measures of disproportionality, which are shaped by the exclusion of parties at any policy position, such analysis can focus directly on the normative concern of the majoritarian vision that citizens and their representatives share the same preference majorities. In this article, we shall analyse the correspondence of legislative and citizen medians on the left-right scale, which captures this majoritarian concern. In a single-issue dimension, the position of the median is privileged because it is the only policy position that cannot be defeated by another position in a head-on vote. The further from the citizen median the legislative median is located, the larger the citizen majority that would prefer an alternative. While this is the critical property for majoritarians, it is obviously relevant for proponents of other visions of representation as well. Although non-majoritarians, who desire to see the full range of citizen preferences in the as such would therefore be inappropriate for normative evaluations of electoral systems from a majoritarian point of view.
Despite the inevitable concerns about the left-right metric, it has two critical advantages. First, this approach allows us begin analysis with a direct measure of citizen preferences rather than with votes. Secondly, unlike measures of disproportionality, which are shaped by the exclusion of parties at any policy position, such analysis can focus directly on the normative concern of the majoritarian vision that citizens and their representatives share the same preference majorities. In this article, we shall analyse the correspondence of legislative and citizen medians on the left-right scale, which captures this majoritarian concern. In a single-issue dimension, the position of the median is privileged because it is the only policy position that cannot be defeated by another position in a head-on vote. The further from the citizen median the legislative median is located, the larger the citizen majority that would prefer an alternative. While this is the critical property for majoritarians, it is obviously relevant for proponents of other visions of representation as well. Although non-majoritarians, who desire to see the full range of citizen preferences in the legislature, may feel that the correspondence of the medians is not sufficient for good representation, they should still wish the legislative body to be centred on the citizen distribution, which requires good correspondence of the medians.
ELECTORAL LAW AND DISPROPORTIONALITY

Electoral Systems: The Effective Threshold
Before moving into the heart of our argument, it will be necessary to take a short detour into the problems of measuring electoral laws and disproportionality. The reason for this is fairly straightforward. Electoral laws vary on numerous dimensions; many of these dimensions have an impact on how difficult it will be for a party to gain seats in the assembly. For example, the German electoral system features a 5 per cent minimum threshold for representation, which tends to increase disproportionality as small parties are left out of the legislature. Other electoral systems, for example Norway before 1989, do not employ legal thresholds, but have relatively small district magnitudes or other features that can also make entry more difficult for small parties. We expect theoretically that where entry is more difficult, there is greater likelihood of disproportionality in representation. To study systematically the relationship between electoral law and disproportionality, it would be desirable to find a measure that combines these various aspects of electoral systems in such a way as to make meaningful comparison across systems possible. Fortunately, we can take advantage of a concept that has been widely employed in the literature on electoral systems for this purpose: Arend Lijphart's notion of an 'effective threshold'.6 The purpose of this measure is to take the various aspects of an electoral system, and to convert them into an equivalent (fictitious) legal threshold that would have approximately the same effect on difficulty of entry to the legislature as the electoral law under consideration.
In particular, the effective threshold aims to capture two properties of an electoral system. The first is its 'upper threshold,' i.e. an approximation of the maximum vote share a party or candidate could receive under the most adverse circumstances without winning a seat. The second is the 'lower threshold', i.e. an approximation of the minimum vote share that could win a party a seat under the most favourable circumstances. If there is no stipulated national minimum, Lijphart calculates the average of the 'upper' and 'lower' threshold numbers to be the effective threshold of an electoral system. The exact formula is given by:7 50% 50% legislature, may feel that the correspondence of the medians is not sufficient for good representation, they should still wish the legislative body to be centred on the citizen distribution, which requires good correspondence of the medians.
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Effective Threshold and Disproportionality
That disproportionality rises with increases in the effective threshold has been well documented. In our sample, consisting of seventy elections in seventeen countries between 1977 and 1993, we find similar results. The particular disproportionality measure we use in our analysis is Michael Gallagher's least squares index.'0 The data are presented graphically in Figure 1 , a scatter plot of disproportionality by Lijphart's effective threshold measure. The SMD systems (due to their assigned effective threshold of 35) are grouped together at the right side of the graph, while the PR systems are positioned on the left side. Even to the unaided eye, the result is unambiguous: empirically, at least, higher thresholds do seem to entail higher disproportionality scores. " The more difficult an electoral system makes it for parties to gain representation in the legislature, the greater the divergence, on average, between vote and seat shares that parties obtain.12 8 Lijphart, Electoral Systems, p. 27 9 The Appendix Table Al, available If a national minimum threshold exists and if it exceeds this average, Lijphart uses it as the effective threshold. One difficulty with this measure is that for single-member, plurality-rule (SMD) systems, it yields an effective threshold of 50 per cent, which is equivalent to the upper threshold. Therefore we follow the convention of assigning a value of 35 per cent to these systems.8 The highest threshold for any non-single member district system in our sample is only about 13 per cent (France in 1986).9 Intuitively, the effective threshold thus provides us with a rough estimate of the difficulty of gaining seats in a given electoral system. The higher the effective threshold, the more support a party must secure, on average, in order to gain seats. As is intuitive, and as the formula makes clear, the effective threshold falls with increases in district magnitude.
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A BASELINE MODEL OF NAIVE VOTERS AND PARTIES
In order to set up the remainder of our argument, in which we move beyond disproportionality as a measure of the quality of representation, let us begin with a very intuitive, if constrained, approach to understanding how election rules can shape the translation of the distribution of citizen preferences into the distribution of legislative party positions. First, let us assume that the distribution of citizen preferences is reasonably approximated by a normal, bell-shaped curve. In fact, for the countries that we shall be examining this is empirically a well-founded assumption in the 1980s and 1990s. Table 1 shows the distribution of citizen self-placement on the left-right scale for our seventeen countries in the early 1980s. Examination of the citizen distributions in the early 1990s shows no striking differences.
To explore the implications of different election laws, let us assume initially that there are ten parties, each offering election promises corresponding to the ten positions on the left-right scale. Let us also assume, in this 'naive' baseline (F'note continued) higher thresholds, but also suffer from substantial malapportionment of seats across districts. We cannot disentangle the effects here, but this malapportionment undoubtedly leads to some over-attribution of disproportionality. Note that disproportionality in Norway declined from about 6 to about 4 after the rules were revised, decreasing effective magnitude as well as improving apportionment (see appendices on the internet version of this article) Thirdly, we classify Australia and France with the other (simple plurality) single-member district systems (as does Lijphart), despite special features of their election rules (preferential vote, two-round majority vote). While these special features may well affect party competition, their impact on difficulty of entry to the legislature, and especially the local-national cancellation problem discussed below, is similar to the simple plurality systems. 
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This baseline model suggests that as we increase the threshold, we would observe: (1) increasing vote-seat disproportionality, as small parties are eliminated; (2) declining variance in the preferences in the legislature, both absolutely and relative to the citizen variance, because the eliminated parties tend to be those at the extremes;'3 (3) continued good approximation between the median ideological position in the legislature and the median ideological position of the electorate. Moreover, as the threshold increases, at some point the median party in the legislature will gain a majority of seats. This majority will be associated with relatively high vote-seat disproportionality and, at the same time, with good correspondence between the citizen and legislative medians. These results would presumably please majoritarian theorists, but be disturbing for those who favour broader representation of all points of view in policy negotiations. It is precisely this expected pattern of high disproportionality, reduced variance and good correspondence of medians that should make us wary of assuming that disproportionality in vote-seat relationships will necessarily be normatively undesirable for everyone. High disproportionality can coexist with good representation as measured by other criteria, e.g. median correspondence.
model, that each voter votes for the party closest to him or her. Initially, consider that the election rules provide for a single national, multi-member district in which all parties gaining over 0.67 per cent of the votes win a percentage of legislative seats proportional to their percentage of the vote. (This characterization corresponds roughly to the electoral rules used in the Netherlands.) Given these circumstances we can see that the election outcome would result in all ten parties attaining legislative representation and a distribution of preferences in the legislature extremely similar to the distribution of preferences in the electorate. Specifically, there would be: (1) no vote-seat disproportionality; (2) a close match between the standard deviations of citizen and legislative preference distributions; (3) close correspondence between the citizen and legislative medians. Now, we can consider what would happen if we gradually increased the minimum percentage of the votes necessary to qualify for seats in the legislature while holding constant the number of parties and the assumption of sincerely voting citizens. Obviously, as we increase the threshold, parties at left-right positions favoured by small numbers of citizens start to drop out. We can see that with the citizen distributions in Table 1 , as we approach about 5 per cent, a number of small parties would be disqualified in each country. As we approach 10 per cent, more parties would be eliminated. Given the 'bell-shaped' distributions seen in Table 1 , these would continue almost everywhere to be parties at the two extremes. While Table 1 suggests some asymmetrical 'lumpiness' at a few points, the effects are pretty smooth, and they continue, ever sharper as we approach even 20 per cent.
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In SMD plurality rule systems, however, the percentage of the vote that can be 'wasted' in any given district can be, and usually is, quite substantial, especially if the race is competitive. In aggregating to the national level, we are aggregating over a large number of districts, each of which is likely to experience high disproportionality. The disproportionality at the national level will therefore depend crucially on the 'cancellation effects' across electoral districts, i.e., on the manner in which parties are 'compensated' for underrepresentation in some districts by over-representation in others.17 If cancellation works well, disproportionality can be low in SMD systems even though there is large distortion in each individual district. If cancellation fails, however, disproportionality can be substantial. The precise point of partisan gerrymandering in SMD systems is to exploit this fact by ensuring that the cancellation process (or rather, the failure thereof) systematically works against a particular party.
Failures to reduce disproportionality: co-ordination and convergence failures
These downward pressures create the potential for high threshold systems to feature low disproportionality. However, it is unlikely that they will systematically depress vote-seat distortion to the level prevalent in low threshold systems. This is so because a number of conditions must be met in order to make the downward pressure of high threshold systems effective. First, the number of parties must be reduced in order to limit the potential for wasted votes. Secondly, wins and losses must cancel in significant ways across districts. The disproportionality of such systems is therefore highly susceptible to any failure of these conditions to be met.
Consider the difficulties introduced by the cancellation process. Higher thresholds create the potential for higher disproportionality at the district level. Whether or not this disproportionality will carry over from the district-level to the national-level will depend on cancellation, i.e. on how under-and over-representation for parties will cancel across districts. Since the deviations that must be balanced are potentially larger the higher the threshold, cancellation effects will take on greater significance in high threshold systems. national level.'6 Of course, this is exactly what these systems aim at. The point of PR systems is precisely to reflect the vote distribution as closely as possible into the legislative distribution, and their success in doing so is evident in Figure 1 . In SMD plurality rule systems, however, the percentage of the vote that can be 'wasted' in any given district can be, and usually is, quite substantial, especially if the race is competitive. In aggregating to the national level, we are aggregating over a large number of districts, each of which is likely to experience high disproportionality. The disproportionality at the national level will therefore depend crucially on the 'cancellation effects' across electoral districts, i.e., on the manner in which parties are 'compensated' for underrepresentation in some districts by over-representation in others.17 If cancellation works well, disproportionality can be low in SMD systems even though there is large distortion in each individual district. If cancellation fails, however, disproportionality can be substantial. The precise point of partisan gerrymandering in SMD systems is to exploit this fact by ensuring that the cancellation process (or rather, the failure thereof) systematically works against a particular party.
Consider the difficulties introduced by the cancellation process. Higher thresholds create the potential for higher disproportionality at the district level. Whether or not this disproportionality will carry over from the district-level to the national-level will depend on cancellation, i.e. on how under-and over-representation for parties will cancel across districts. Since the deviations that must be balanced are potentially larger the higher the threshold, cancellation effects will take on greater significance in high threshold systems. consequence, higher threshold systems will be more susceptible to cancellation failures, and such failures impose greater costs in terms of disproportionality. In particular, we do not expect cancellation to work efficiently when systematic distortions favour one or the other party in the races, leading one party consistently to finish in second (or third, etc.) place. A number of events can produce such distortions. The most significant and obvious one would be a failure of one, or both, of the parties to converge to the median voter. If voters are systematically favouring one party, it is unlikely that the over-representation of the favoured party will be balanced out by losses in other districts. Short-term effects, such as scandals, economic performance, or the popularity of a particular political figure may also lead to distortions that hinder effective cancellation. Moreover, a failure to reduce the number of parties is likely to exacerbate this cancellation problem.l8 The larger the vote share that can be wasted by a party that does not gain seats or that is severely under-represented in the legislature, the higher vote-seat distortion will be. Clearly, this cost of a failure to reduce the number of parties increases with the threshold. Since in SMD systems, multi-party competition usually implies that some parties are severely under-represented in the legislature, failing to co-ordinate on the proper number of parties is particularly disastrous for disproportionality in SMD systems.19 At the same time, these systems are the most likely to feel the constraint of the M + 1 rule because their carrying capacity for political parties is low. (The effective numbers of parties in the PR systems in our dataset are almost certainly all below the carrying capacity of those systems.) SMD systems are therefore especially susceptible to this co-ordination failure. Indeed, there is some prima facia evidence that failure to reduce the number of parties in SMD systems does increase disproportionality. For the twenty-one SMD elections in the set, the simple Pearson correlation between the effective number of parties in the election and the disproportionality score is 0.48, (significant at the 5 per cent level assuming the appropriateness of ordinary regression).20
The most important implication of our argument is that SMD systems do not consequence, higher threshold systems will be more susceptible to cancellation failures, and such failures impose greater costs in terms of disproportionality. In particular, we do not expect cancellation to work efficiently when systematic distortions favour one or the other party in the races, leading one party consistently to finish in second (or third, etc.) place. A number of events can produce such distortions. The most significant and obvious one would be a failure of one, or both, of the parties to converge to the median voter. If voters are systematically favouring one party, it is unlikely that the over-representation of the favoured party will be balanced out by losses in other districts. Short-term effects, such as scandals, economic performance, or the popularity of a particular political figure may also lead to distortions that hinder effective cancellation. Moreover, a failure to reduce the number of parties is likely to exacerbate this cancellation problem.l8 The larger the vote share that can be wasted by a party that does not gain seats or that is severely under-represented in the legislature, the higher vote-seat distortion will be. Clearly, this cost of a failure to reduce the number of parties increases with the threshold. Since in SMD systems, multi-party competition usually implies that some parties are severely under-represented in the legislature, failing to co-ordinate on the proper number of parties is particularly disastrous for disproportionality in SMD systems.19 At the same time, these systems are the most likely to feel the constraint of the M + 1 rule because their carrying capacity for political parties is low. (The effective numbers of parties in the PR systems in our dataset are almost certainly all below the carrying capacity of those systems.) SMD systems are therefore especially susceptible to this co-ordination failure. Indeed, there is some prima facia evidence that failure to reduce the number of parties in SMD systems does increase disproportionality. For the twenty-one SMD elections in the set, the simple Pearson correlation between the effective number of parties in the election and the disproportionality score is 0.48, (significant at the 5 per cent level assuming the appropriateness of ordinary regression).20
The most important implication of our argument is that SMD systems do not 18 As Cox (Making Votes Count, pp. 79f.) points out, the reduction to M + 1 parties poses a co-ordination problem faced by politicians and voters. Voters have an interest in concentrating their votes on parties that can gain representation. Politicians, in turn, want to co-ordinate by only offering parties that can gain sufficient support, and refrain from maintaining permanent losers. Creating mutual expectations about the particular parties that will gain sufficient votes is the co-ordination problem that must be solved. If this problem is not solved, too many parties will be competing with the result that several parties are shut out of the legislature. Several things can account for such failure to reduce the number of parties. There may be insufficient information to create clear expectations about which parties will not gain representation and should therefore withdraw. Or politicians may care intensely about the future, and stay in a race not to win, but to establish a position for coming elections. In either case, we would not expect parties to disappear in response to strategic behaviour. 
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necessarily lead to high disproportionality, but merely have the potential for such distortion, depending on how effectively the downward pressures we have discussed -strategic reduction of parties and cancellation effects -serve to reduce disproportionality. These downward pressures are dependent on a number of contingencies. The importance of these contingencies (which may or may not hold in any particular election) suggests that disproportionality in SMD systems should vary to a greater extent than disproportionality in PR systems. This conclusion produces a testable prediction. If we are right, the standard deviation of disproportionality should be much larger in SMD systems than in PR systems. The scatter plot in Figure 1 suggested such a pattern. Table  2 (on p. 401), which shows the means and standard deviation of disproportionality across four categories of the effective threshold, confirms that this is the case. The standard deviation of disproportionality in the SMD systems is strikingly higher than in any of the three categories of PR systems. It is a little more than double the standard deviation of all PR systems combined. Clearly, disproportionality varies to a much greater extent under plurality rule.
ELECTION RULES AND CORRESPONDENCE OF MEDIANS
Increasing the effective threshold of an electoral system thus clearly leads, on average, to higher disproportionality and greater variation in disproportionality. This is one main reason why some theorists have concluded that PR systems deliver better representation than Westminster, SMD systems. However, in our naive baseline model (assuming multiple parties and sincere voters), we suggested that poor representation in the sense of vote-seat disproportionality need not imply poor correspondence of the citizen and legislative medians. Increasing the effective threshold implied increasingly poor vote-seat correspondence, but relatively unchanging correspondence between the position of the median voter and the median legislator. In this section we want to find out whether electoral rules do in fact make little difference for correspondence of the preference medians. As far as we know, this has not previously been investigated. Should the implications of the naive model fail to hold, we want to try to understand why they do not. For the question of median correspondence, the number of political parties is less important than the positions they take in ideological space relative to voters. We thus begin by asking about the substantive party positions various electoral systems are likely to generate. necessarily lead to high disproportionality, but merely have the potential for such distortion, depending on how effectively the downward pressures we have discussed -strategic reduction of parties and cancellation effects -serve to reduce disproportionality. These downward pressures are dependent on a number of contingencies. The importance of these contingencies (which may or may not hold in any particular election) suggests that disproportionality in SMD systems should vary to a greater extent than disproportionality in PR systems. This conclusion produces a testable prediction. If we are right, the standard deviation of disproportionality should be much larger in SMD systems than in PR systems. The scatter plot in Figure 1 suggested such a pattern. Table  2 (on p. 401), which shows the means and standard deviation of disproportionality across four categories of the effective threshold, confirms that this is the case. The standard deviation of disproportionality in the SMD systems is strikingly higher than in any of the three categories of PR systems. It is a little more than double the standard deviation of all PR systems combined. Clearly, disproportionality varies to a much greater extent under plurality rule.
Increasing the effective threshold of an electoral system thus clearly leads, on average, to higher disproportionality and greater variation in disproportionality. This is one main reason why some theorists have concluded that PR systems deliver better representation than Westminster, SMD systems. However, in our naive baseline model (assuming multiple parties and sincere voters), we suggested that poor representation in the sense of vote-seat disproportionality need not imply poor correspondence of the citizen and legislative medians. Increasing the effective threshold implied increasingly poor vote-seat correspondence, but relatively unchanging correspondence between the position of the median voter and the median legislator. In this section we want to find out whether electoral rules do in fact make little difference for correspondence of the preference medians. As far as we know, this has not previously been investigated. Should the implications of the naive model fail to hold, we want to try to understand why they do not. For the question of median correspondence, the number of political parties is less important than the positions they take in ideological space relative to voters. We thus begin by asking about the substantive party positions various electoral systems are likely to generate. strategically, derive a similar result, with one party taking the position of the median voter while the other two parties in their model locate symmetrically around the median. As Cox has concluded, 'equilibria in multi-party PR systems are expected to be such that (1) each party has a fairly well-defined and narrow ideological appeal, and (2) parties are dispersed fairly widely over the ideological spectrum.'23 A pleasant consequence of these results is that PR systems in general hold out great potential for good median correspondence. The position of the median voter should be closely represented by a party. At worst, if there is an even number of evenly-spaced parties, the two most centrist ones will be equidistant from the median.24 And if the voter-distribution is dense so that most voters are clustered around the median (as in many of the empirical distributions in Table   1 ), the two closest parties should not be very far away from the citizen median. If a very high threshold, historical or cultural circumstances, or economies of scale reduce the number of parties competing in a PR system to only two, then a single party will achieve a majority and, by definition, will include the median legislator. Good preference correspondence will then depend entirely on the winning party being at the position of the median voter. Fortunately for correspondence (and normative majoritarian theories of desirable representation), Downs's theory of two-party competition predicts convergence of both parties to the position of the median voter.25 Under any national PR system, regardless of threshold, we can therefore expect good correspondence of citizen and legislative medians and (in that sense) good preference representation. We can also predict fairly clearly the circumstances under which good preference representation would fail: Table   1 ), the two closest parties should not be very far away from the citizen median. If a very high threshold, historical or cultural circumstances, or economies of scale reduce the number of parties competing in a PR system to only two, then a single party will achieve a majority and, by definition, will include the median legislator. Good preference correspondence will then depend entirely on the winning party being at the position of the median voter. Fortunately for correspondence (and normative majoritarian theories of desirable representation), Downs's theory of two-party competition predicts convergence of both parties to the position of the median voter.25 Under any national PR system, regardless of threshold, we can therefore expect good correspondence of citizen and legislative medians and (in that sense) good preference representation. We can also predict fairly clearly the circumstances under which good preference representation would fail: (1) Preference representation may fail in purely two-party systems if the pure Downsian model fails -if the role of activists, multiple levels of candidate selection (primaries and general elections) or a concern about variation in the geographic configuration of preferences within and across districts lead two dominating parties to fail to converge to the national median. Obviously, these considerations do not mean the parties are not acting strategically, just that additional factors are potentially relevant to their strategic decisions. It is noteworthy that, here, as in the analysis of disproportionality, SMD systems are distinct in that they raise additional considerations because of the geographic distribution of preferences. 
Moreover, many citizens will be uninformed about the details of policy issues and the reasonableness of different alternatives. A common response in the face of this complexity consists in collapsing the problem of identifying a citizen's detailed policy preferences into a stance towards a general policy direction in the discourse of the citizen's society.
The instrument that we use for doing so here consists of a voter's self-placement on the 'left-right' ideological continuum, obtained from various Eurobarometer surveys and the two World Values Studies. In the democracies in our analysis in this period, the language of 'left' and 'right' reflects a (loosely) unidimensional discourse familiar to citizens and elites. It is not only the most widely available single measure of the preferences of citizens in different countries, but seems to meet better than any alternative our need to capture comparably the general stances of citizens and the general policy orientations of the parties that compete for policy-making positions. Over the years, the left-right language has assimilated various specific issues and alternatives that have become important to voters and the parties who appeal to them. In the 1960s and 1970s the degree of government ownership in the economy was perhaps the most important component, although views on defence policy also mattered. The former issue was revitalized by debate about denationalization in the 1980s, while the collapse of international communism made relations with the Soviet Union less important. In some countries 'left and right' encompassed views on the role of the Church in politics, in others it did not. With the rise of 'new politics' issues of environmental protection and citizen participation, the left-right dialogue also came to incorporate these issues to varying degrees in 32 We assume that 'party' is the appropriate unit in the legislature, given the very highly cohesive party voting in the legislatures of virtually all these (parliamentary) systems (see Michael Laver and Norman Schofield, Multiparty Government (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990) Appendix A). The legislative median is the position of the party that contains the median legislator, assuming all members of the party take the same position. geographic considerations also operating to create variance in the expectations. Moreover, the presence of multiple parties may split the votes in a way such that the party closest to the median is not even the plurality winner. This is a special version of M + 1 failure, but one with potentially very large impact on preference correspondence.
Empirical Tests of Election Rules and Preference Misrepresentation
To test preference (mis)representation we need direct measures of the preferences of citizens and of the positions of the parties in the legislatures.32 Naturally, it is conceptually and empirically difficult to measure the relationship between citizens' preferences and parties' positions and policies in different countries. Public policy in modem society covers an enormous range of possible activities. Different societies have different needs and different traditions. Even within the same countries different citizens care about different issues. Moreover, many citizens will be uninformed about the details of policy issues and the reasonableness of different alternatives. A common response in the face of this complexity consists in collapsing the problem of identifying a citizen's detailed policy preferences into a stance towards a general policy direction in the discourse of the citizen's society.
The instrument that we use for doing so here consists of a voter's self-placement on the 'left-right' ideological continuum, obtained from various Eurobarometer surveys and the two World Values Studies. In the democracies in our analysis in this period, the language of 'left' and 'right' reflects a (loosely) unidimensional discourse familiar to citizens and elites. It is not only the most widely available single measure of the preferences of citizens in different countries, but seems to meet better than any alternative our need to capture comparably the general stances of citizens and the general policy orientations of the parties that compete for policy-making positions. Over the years, the left-right language has assimilated various specific issues and alternatives that have become important to voters and the parties who appeal to them. In the 1960s and 1970s the degree of government ownership in the economy was perhaps the most important component, although views on defence policy also mattered. The former issue was revitalized by debate about denationalization in the 1980s, while the collapse of international communism made relations with the Soviet Union less important. In some countries 'left and right' encompassed views on the role of the Church in politics, in others it did not. With the rise of 'new politics' issues of environmental protection and citizen participation, the left-right dialogue also came to incorporate these issues to varying degrees in 32 We assume that 'party' is the appropriate unit in the legislature, given the very highly cohesive Despite the small number of cases, which prevents our using citizen estimates to replicate the general analysis, the close correspondence strongly supports the comparability of expert party placements to citizen self-placements in the local discourse. Despite the small number of cases, which prevents our using citizen estimates to replicate the general analysis, the close correspondence strongly supports the comparability of expert party placements to citizen self-placements in the local discourse. However, it is the SMD systems that stand out most strikingly as failing to achieve good correspondence between citizen and legislative medians. The average legislative median is more than twice as far from the median citizen in these systems as in the PR systems. The results for the PR systems are, on average, consistent with our theoretical expectations. There is substantial variance (the standard deviation is about as large as the score itself in the PR systems), but most of these systems seem to be performing rather well in creating correspondence between median citizen and median legislator. The results for the SMD systems, by contrast, are quite contrary to the theoretical expectation. On average the median legislator is one-and-a-half scale points from the median citizen in these systems. Given the sharp divergence from theoretical expectations in the single-member district systems, but not (on average) in the other systems, the puzzle of this particular representation failure is the target of further analysis below.
Before moving on to this task, however, it is useful to 'cross-check' our results by confirming the robustness of the distinct difference between the relatively good performance of the PR systems in achieving correspondence between citizen and legislative medians and the poorer performance of the SMD systems. To do so, we employ three alternative measures to estimate the distance between median citizen and legislator. The first two measures draw on a study that asked country experts to place the parties in their respective countries on several specific issue scales rather than on a general left-right scale.37 The Laver and Hunt survey employed a twenty-point scale (which we converted to a ten-point scale), and it was conducted roughly at the midpoint between our two main expert studies. Given the time period for our sample, the two issues included in the Laver and Hunt analysis that seem to correspond most closely to the general left-right scale consist of the items placing parties on the issues of public versus private ownership in the economy and on the trade-off between taxes and services.38 For each of these issues, we calculated the distance between the median citizen position on the left-right scale and the median party position (where the median party is the median party according to that scale).
The third (and very different) alternative measure we employ to estimate the placement of parties is provided by a large project that studied and coded the manifestos of political parties from the end of the Second World War until the early 1990s (in most of our countries).39 Although these data were collected for systems show greater average distances and greater standard deviations. However, it is the SMD systems that stand out most strikingly as failing to achieve good correspondence between citizen and legislative medians. The average legislative median is more than twice as far from the median citizen in these systems as in the PR systems.
The results for the PR systems are, on average, consistent with our theoretical expectations. There is substantial variance (the standard deviation is about as large as the score itself in the PR systems), but most of these systems seem to be performing rather well in creating correspondence between median citizen and median legislator. The results for the SMD systems, by contrast, are quite contrary to the theoretical expectation. On average the median legislator is one-and-a-half scale points from the median citizen in these systems. Given the sharp divergence from theoretical expectations in the single-member district systems, but not (on average) in the other systems, the puzzle of this particular representation failure is the target of further analysis below.
The third (and very different) alternative measure we employ to estimate the placement of parties is provided by a large project that studied and coded the manifestos of political parties from the end of the Second World War until the early 1990s (in most of our countries).39 Although these data were collected for other purposes, Laver and Budge developed a scheme for classifying manifesto sentences as being 'left' or 'right' and determining the relative proportion of left and right mentions to estimate the positions of the parties (naturally, the scale runs from -100 to + 100).40 Once again, we can use this measure to estimate which party contains the median legislator. However, it is still necessary to transform the proportion of mentions to correspond to the ten-point left-right scale used by citizens. To do so, we use a standard ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to predict the expert placement position of parties in the Castles and Mair and the Huber and Inglehart studies from the manifesto score and country dummy variables, using all the parties for which we have data (a total of 260). The coefficients from this regression were then used to estimate a predicted ten-point left-right position for each of the median parties according to the manifestos data.4' Once again, we can then calculate the absolute distance between the median legislator and the median citizen on the ten-point scale. Table 3 shows the results of analysing this distance using the three alternative measures. The table reports results of a standard OLS regression in which the absolute distance between median citizen and legislator is predicted using three dummy variables that correspond to the three PR categories. The SMD systems thus comprise the missing category. Each column in the table corresponds to a different procedure used to measure the placement of the parties.42 If the poorer performance of the SMD systems is robust to the procedure used to measure the party positions, then we should see consistently negative coefficients in all the columns and the coefficients should be of similar size, as all measures have been transformed to the ten-point left-right scale. However, because the number of cases varies and because the use of specific issues and of the manifestos presumably takes less account of the local context than the local experts on the party systems would take, we expect fewer of the coefficients to be statistically significant in the columns on the right of the table.
The table results are very reassuring for the robustness of the main results. On the far left we have replicated the results reported in Table 2 using 41 It is important to note that the manifesto classification scheme does not take account of the local political discourse. Inspection of the manifestos' data shows clearly that by the international coding criteria, the discourse in some countries is more 'left' and the discourse in others more 'right'. Hence the need to add country dummies to the regression equation to calibrate the mid-point of the local discourse. We are grateful to Professor David Weimer for suggesting this approach. 42 Most procedures yield the same party at the median, but where they do not, the party that is the legislative median on the scale in question is the one used to determine the distance from the citizens. The samples on which the different regressions are based vary because not all measures were available for all cases in the full dataset (see the appendices to the internet version of this article). other purposes, Laver and Budge developed a scheme for classifying manifesto sentences as being 'left' or 'right' and determining the relative proportion of left and right mentions to estimate the positions of the parties (naturally, the scale runs from -100 to + 100).40 Once again, we can use this measure to estimate which party contains the median legislator. However, it is still necessary to transform the proportion of mentions to correspond to the ten-point left-right scale used by citizens. To do so, we use a standard ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to predict the expert placement position of parties in the Castles and Mair and the Huber and Inglehart studies from the manifesto score and country dummy variables, using all the parties for which we have data (a total of 260). The coefficients from this regression were then used to estimate a predicted ten-point left-right position for each of the median parties according to the manifestos data.4' Once again, we can then calculate the absolute distance between the median legislator and the median citizen on the ten-point scale. Table 3 shows the results of analysing this distance using the three alternative measures. The table reports results of a standard OLS regression in which the absolute distance between median citizen and legislator is predicted using three dummy variables that correspond to the three PR categories. The SMD systems thus comprise the missing category. Each column in the table corresponds to a different procedure used to measure the placement of the parties.42 If the poorer performance of the SMD systems is robust to the procedure used to measure the party positions, then we should see consistently negative coefficients in all the columns and the coefficients should be of similar size, as all measures have been transformed to the ten-point left-right scale. However, because the number of cases varies and because the use of specific issues and of the manifestos presumably takes less account of the local context than the local experts on the party systems would take, we expect fewer of the coefficients to be statistically significant in the columns on the right of the table.
The table results are very reassuring for the robustness of the main results. On the far left we have replicated the results reported in Table 2 using 41 It is important to note that the manifesto classification scheme does not take account of the local political discourse. Inspection of the manifestos' data shows clearly that by the international coding criteria, the discourse in some countries is more 'left' and the discourse in others more 'right'. Hence the need to add country dummies to the regression equation to calibrate the mid-point of the local discourse. We are grateful to Professor David Weimer for suggesting this approach. 42 Most procedures yield the same party at the median, but where they do not, the party that is the legislative median on the scale in question is the one used to determine the distance from the citizens. The samples on which the different regressions are based vary because not all measures were available for all cases in the full dataset (see the appendices to the internet version of this article). At three-and-a-half to five times their standard errors these distances are highly significant (assuming the independence of the cases). The high threshold PR cases are more similar to the SMD systems, but still a significant distance closer to the citizen medians. The next column of the table shows strikingly similar results using the Laver-Hunt measure of party positions on public ownership. All the coefficients are also negative and even of roughly similar magnitude to those in Column 1. With many fewer cases (because the survey is only at a single time point) and a more specified issue, the standard errors are larger, but distances in the two lower threshold PR cases are still significantly less (at the 5 per cent level) than in the SMD cases. Even the third column, which shows the tax/service trade-off issue, has consistently negative coefficients about the size of their standard errors, although only 60 per cent the size of the coefficients in the first two columns. Finally, the last column shows the results based on the transformed manifestos data. Once again, we see the familiar pattern of negative coefficients, with the two low threshold PR systems around half a scale point closer to the citizen median than in the SMD systems. The standard errors are fairly low and the differences from the SMD results are strongly significant. The highest threshold PR systems, however, are only slightly closer to the median than the SMD systems. Nevertheless, these results also support the general pattern of the findings.
We should re-emphasize that, in terms of conceptual fit, we are most confident in the general expert left-right placements in measuring citizen-legislative distances. It is also the case that these measures are the most widely available and therefore maximize the observations on which the analysis is based. Thus, we view the three alternative measures primarily as secondary measures used to validate the central result. Clearly, this cross-check confirms that the general result -on average the legislative medians are located at a greater distance from the citizen medians in the SMD systems than in the PR systems -is quite robust. It seems appropriate, then, to conclude by a more detailed examination of the sources of that distance, following our earlier theoretical expectations of where the connection might break down.
Party Competition and the Citizen Median in SMD Electoral Systems
Our expectations about good preference representation in the single-member district systems stemmed from the combination of predictions of two of the most famous theories of political parties: Duverger's prediction that single-member district election rules will tend to be two-party systems and Downs's theory that two-party competition will drive both parties to converge to the median voter. This combination is elegantly elaborated by Cox.43 We have already seen that parties do not seem to reduce sufficiently in many of the single-member district nearly a full scale point closer to the citizen median than those produced by the SMD elections. At three-and-a-half to five times their standard errors these distances are highly significant (assuming the independence of the cases). The high threshold PR cases are more similar to the SMD systems, but still a significant distance closer to the citizen medians.
The next column of the table shows strikingly similar results using the Laver-Hunt measure of party positions on public ownership. All the coefficients are also negative and even of roughly similar magnitude to those in Column 1. With many fewer cases (because the survey is only at a single time point) and a more specified issue, the standard errors are larger, but distances in the two lower threshold PR cases are still significantly less (at the 5 per cent level) than in the SMD cases. Even the third column, which shows the tax/service trade-off issue, has consistently negative coefficients about the size of their standard errors, although only 60 per cent the size of the coefficients in the first two columns. Finally, the last column shows the results based on the transformed manifestos data. Once again, we see the familiar pattern of negative coefficients, with the two low threshold PR systems around half a scale point closer to the citizen median than in the SMD systems. The standard errors are fairly low and the differences from the SMD results are strongly significant. The highest threshold PR systems, however, are only slightly closer to the median than the SMD systems. Nevertheless, these results also support the general pattern of the findings.
Our expectations about good preference representation in the single-member district systems stemmed from the combination of predictions of two of the most famous theories of political parties: Duverger's prediction that single-member district election rules will tend to be two-party systems and Downs's theory that two-party competition will drive both parties to converge to the median voter. This combination is elegantly elaborated by Cox.43 We have already seen that parties do not seem to reduce sufficiently in many of the single-member district 43 We suggested in the theoretical discussion that the failure of the parties to converge to the median would probably be the proximate cause of divergence between the citizen median and the legislative median in the single-member district systems. This is largely true. Most of the elections are multi-party contests and Downsian convergence of both parties to the median is rare, at best. But there is more to the story. We also noted that in multi-party contests, other and the median voter. What is not so well known is the degree to which elections in Australia at about the same time show a similar disaster for centrism and representation of the median voter.
There are quite a few cases of asymmetric convergence. That is, one party is fairly close to the median, while the other is farther away. In strict two-party competition, we would, of course, expect the closer party to win. But in most of these elections there are more than two parties competing and the various ways of splitting the vote lead to unpredictable outcomes. There is marked asymmetry ( We suggested in the theoretical discussion that the failure of the parties to converge to the median would probably be the proximate cause of divergence between the citizen median and the legislative median in the single-member district systems. This is largely true. Most of the elections are multi-party contests and Downsian convergence of both parties to the median is rare, at best. But there is more to the story. We also noted that in multi-party contests, other and the median voter. What is not so well known is the degree to which elections in Australia at about the same time show a similar disaster for centrism and representation of the median voter.
There are quite a few cases of asymmetric convergence. That is, one party is fairly close to the median, while the other is farther away. In strict two-party competition, we would, of course, expect the closer party to win. But in most of these elections there are more than two parties competing and the various ways of splitting the vote lead to unpredictable outcomes. There is marked asymmetry ( We suggested in the theoretical discussion that the failure of the parties to converge to the median would probably be the proximate cause of divergence between the citizen median and the legislative median in the single-member district systems. This is largely true. Most of the elections are multi-party contests and Downsian convergence of both parties to the median is rare, at best. But there is more to the story. We also noted that in multi-party contests, It is clear that the Duverger-Downs-Cox predictions look best in the United States where the district level contests are dominated by only two political parties. To this extent, the suggestion that multi-partism would be the less proximate cause of failure of party convergence in the SMD systems has some plausibility. But even in the United States the parties are not converging as completely as they apparently once did. In so far as the split in the Labour party and the formation of the Social Democrats enhanced British 'multi-partism', it followed the sharp movement of the Labour party to the left, rather than preceded it. At an even larger level than we can here investigate, the changing fortunes in Britain of two-party domination, vote-seat disproportionality, and divergence of the large parties from the citizen median from the 1950s through 1997 seems to illustrate a volatility of representation in these systems for which the standard model in its current state of development remains insufficient.
CONCLUSION:
EFFECTIVE THRESHOLDS, DISPROPORTIONALITY AND
REPRESENTATION
Our purpose in this article has been twofold. On the one hand, we wanted to return to a relationship that has been extensively studied by political scientists interested in electoral systems: the relationship between electoral systems and disproportionality. Although it is well documented that less permissive electoral systems, usually operationalized as systems with higher effective thresholds, are associated with higher vote-seat distortion, the causal connection between the two is often underdeveloped. In the first part of this article, we tried to highlight some of these connections in more detail. Surprisingly, doing so generated new insights into the connection between vote-seat distortion and electoral systems. Most importantly, our emphasis on the importance of cross-district cancellation suggested that high threshold systems do not necessarily lead to higher disproportionality, but merely create the potential for it. However, the conditions necessary to reduce disproportionality are rather stringent. Accordingly, the average disproportionality as well as the variance of vote-seat distortion is expected to be higher in high threshold systems. Our data were indeed consistent with this hypothesis. Part of the interest in the relationship between seats and votes, at least implicitly, derives from the assumption that the votes citizens cast reveal something about their preferences. However, there are two problems with this asymmetric competitions won by the 'wrong party' might feature importantly. The failure of the voters to support parties close to the national median, such as the French Socialists and New Zealand Labour in 1993 and the British Liberal Democrats generally, is indeed part of the picture in the single-member district systems. Generally, these outcomes can be explained by 'co-ordination failures' in the sense that too many parties are competing. But they may also represent district medians that are rather different from the national median, some aspect of multi-dimensionality not consistently reduced to the single left-right scale (such as government scandals or foreign policy), inertia in citizen expectations about nationally 'dominant' and 'minor' parties, or something else.
It is clear that the Duverger-Downs-Cox predictions look best in the United States where the district level contests are dominated by only two political parties. To this extent, the suggestion that multi-partism would be the less proximate cause of failure of party convergence in the SMD systems has some plausibility. But even in the United States the parties are not converging as completely as they apparently once did. In so far as the split in the Labour party and the formation of the Social Democrats enhanced British 'multi-partism', it followed the sharp movement of the Labour party to the left, rather than preceded it. At an even larger level than we can here investigate, the changing fortunes in Britain of two-party domination, vote-seat disproportionality, and divergence of the large parties from the citizen median from the 1950s through 1997 seems to illustrate a volatility of representation in these systems for which the standard model in its current state of development remains insufficient.
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CONCLUSION:
REPRESENTATION
Our purpose in this article has been twofold. On the one hand, we wanted to return to a relationship that has been extensively studied by political scientists interested in electoral systems: the relationship between electoral systems and disproportionality. Although it is well documented that less permissive electoral systems, usually operationalized as systems with higher effective thresholds, are associated with higher vote-seat distortion, the causal connection between the two is often underdeveloped. In the first part of this article, we tried to highlight some of these connections in more detail. Surprisingly, doing so generated new insights into the connection between vote-seat distortion and electoral systems. Most importantly, our emphasis on the importance of cross-district cancellation suggested that high threshold systems do not necessarily lead to higher disproportionality, but merely create the potential for it. However, the conditions necessary to reduce disproportionality are rather stringent. Accordingly, the average disproportionality as well as the variance of vote-seat distortion is expected to be higher in high threshold systems. Our data were indeed consistent with this hypothesis. A second problem with disproportionality as a measure of the quality of representation is that vote-seat disproportionality treats as equally serious all failures of large parties to achieve legislative representation proportionate to their voter support. But for theorists favouring a majoritarian approach to democratic government, what matters for representation is whether the elected majority in the legislature prefers policies favoured by a majority of the citizens. The majoritarian vision that underlies much justification of SMD electoral systems holds explicitly that the point of elections is decisively to choose a government that can directly implement policies preferred by a majority of citizens and is highly accountable.44 Such decisiveness may well entail reduction in the range of represented views. What matters for representation is not vote-seat proportionality, but whether the elected majority is representative of what the majority of citizens want. Some vote-seat disproportionality might help achieve this goal; other disproportionality might hinder it.
Both of these arguments suggest that it would be desirable to find more direct measures of citizen preferences in an attempt to evaluate the quality of representation. In this article, we have suggested one particular measure, namely the correspondence between the medians of citizen and legislative preference distributions on the left-right scale. The most important finding is that although the measure of median correspondence is conceptually better suited for evaluating the quality of representation in SMD systems, these systems do not perform as well as PR systems under this criterion. We gained further confidence in this result, at least for this sample of elections, by examining several different measures of party placements, including their published manifesto positions. At least empirically, PR systems seem to produce systematically closer correspondence between medians.
Cox's suggestion that strategic failures, whether of voters or parties, should be more costly for preference representation in the SMD systems does look remarkably acute.45 The failure of parties to converge to the citizen median and/or to reduce the number of competitors to the carrying capacity of the electoral system can pull legislative medians quite far from the citizens. In some of our PR systems, too, there seem to be similar phenomena: parties near the median not getting the votes one would expect (the Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP) in Germany) or larger than expected gaps near the median in the policy space (Sweden). But because the PR systems do not usually create single-party majorities, these 'failures' are less devastating for representation of the citizen median.
Our empirical findings have normative significance because they undercut an view. First, how citizens vote, and what choices they face (i.e. what parties compete for office) is itself, at least in part, a product of the electoral system. Strategic voters and politicians can behave in ways that obscure the relationship between preferences and votes; hence votes are imperfectly suited to measuring the quality of preference representation. A second problem with disproportionality as a measure of the quality of representation is that vote-seat disproportionality treats as equally serious all failures of large parties to achieve legislative representation proportionate to their voter support. But for theorists favouring a majoritarian approach to democratic government, what matters for representation is whether the elected majority in the legislature prefers policies favoured by a majority of the citizens. The majoritarian vision that underlies much justification of SMD electoral systems holds explicitly that the point of elections is decisively to choose a government that can directly implement policies preferred by a majority of citizens and is highly accountable.44 Such decisiveness may well entail reduction in the range of represented views. What matters for representation is not vote-seat proportionality, but whether the elected majority is representative of what the majority of citizens want. Some vote-seat disproportionality might help achieve this goal; other disproportionality might hinder it.
Our In closing, let us point out some remaining problems and opportunities for future work. One obvious extension, already in progress, is to move the analysis of left-right congruence beyond the legislature to consider in addition the relationship between the citizen median and the positions of parliamentary governments and other influential policy makers. In high-threshold systems, especially SMD systems, the election of single-party majorities implies that the legislative median and the government median will be identical. Obviously, this need not be true in low-threshold systems, where coalition or minority governments may have varying relationships to the legislative and citizen medians.46
A second area for future work consists in attempting to construct more sophisticated or alternative measures to investigate the relationship between citizens and their representatives. A number of difficulties, including the restriction to one dimension, as well as the nature of survey data, make the use of medians on the left-right scale less than ideal. It would be desirable to consider multiple dimensions, substantive issues, and policy behaviour as well as positions. However, the difficulties are formidable. A third direction is to investigate the micro-level connections that are hidden in our analysis. Two questions are particularly important in our assessment: what is the impact and importance of geographic variation in party support; what impact does the precise number of competing parties have? Finally, the paper raises interesting problems for theoretical approaches to party politics, and in particular, for the theory of party competition. Empirically at least, the theoretical notions of Duverger-Downsian competition in single-member district systems do not appear to be reflected well in the data. At the same time, this divergence from our theoretical expectations has important implications. One explanation is that our theories of party competition, at least in their naive form, fail to capture important aspects of the strategic situation in which parties find themselves. We suspect that the district-national level problem and the geographic distribution of party support will be important in this regard. 46 We simply do not have the space to explore these relationships in this article. The need to consider coalition governments and the proper treatment of minority governments, as well as institutional factors giving more influence to the opposition parties, create quite complex analysis problems in many of the PR design systems. However important line of defence for majoritarian democracy's lack of regard for vote-seat distortion. High disproportionality might be acceptable, even desirable, if it is incurred as the price of good median correspondence and retrospective accountability. But in fact, majoritarian democracy is outperformed by its PR competitors in both vote-seat proportionality and correspondence of the citizen and legislative medians. (Any given SMD election outcome, however, might fail in one respect and not the other.)
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